Organisational Consciousness

(See other key terms)

Discussion notes

Creating the term Organisational Consciousness enables us to see organisations as living systems.
Our definition is different from 'corporate consciousness' (e.g. Campion & Palmer, 1996; Lavine & Moore, 1996) used in management theory in that it derived from Marvin Minsky's famous comparison between the consciousness of digital machines and human beings.
Minsky claimed that list-based computer programs (e.g. LISP) are more conscious than human beings (Minsky, 1988).
This reductionist definition of consciousness is pragmatic, rather than philosophical.
In Gaia Theory the biosphere is a symbiotic, self-maintaining system on a global scale.
Arguably there is no useful distinction between ‘living’ and ‘inanimate’ agents (c.f. Lovelock, 1979, Margulis, 1998).
The methods we devised enable us to map organisations in ways that enable us to see them as assets

Defining Organisational Consciousness

''We can begin to define the consciousness of an 'organisation' as the extent and quality of 'working awareness' among all of its active parts. I will refer to these active parts as organisational assets. High levels of 'Organisational Consciousness' would include:

a working awareness of its (external) situation relevant to its survival as an organism.
a working awareness of its (internal) metabolic and cognitive functions necessary to its survival as an organism.

There would also be a sufficient, and appropriate, level of interconnectedness among its parts. Notably, we make no categorically distinction as to whether these 'parts' are biological, or non-biological.

Biological/ecological Assets:
- these would include the bodily appendages, organs and metabolism (e.g. limbs, brain, heart, etc.).
- these would also include the social, political, spiritual (&c.) and/or other relational aspects of the organisation's structure and behaviour.
Non-biological/ecological Assets:
- ''these would include the whole infrastructure and services (e.g. buildings, technologies, legal rights, people, etc.) and how they work together.’'

A Simple Model of Organisational Consciousness

Minsky's idea of consciousness could be presented on a few levels - e.g.:

A state of alertness and control over this structure (and its internal processes).
A state of alertness to relevant events happening around it.
A level of understanding that sees all of the above factors as functionally interconnected.

In these terms, our term 'Organisational Consciousness' can be represented by 'n' number of dots (players in the system) and the extent to which they are interconnected.

AWARENESS OF EXTERIOR STATE

INTERNAL CONNECTEDNESS

This resembles the metabolism of a living organism that only works when their is a requisite level of internal connection and cooperation among its parts. Efficacy can be evaluated using two parameters:

The ratio (%) of assets that directly inter-connect to those that do not.
The average quality or state of rapport for connected assets.

By mapping all of the Organisation's assets (whether or not they are deemed to be of value) one can see where some may be unconnected.

*	CATEGORY	AWARENESS OF EXTERIOR STATE	INTERNAL CONNECTEDNESS
1.	Shamanic Consciousness	100% aware of surroundings	100% information sharing internally
2.	Functionally Semi-conscious	Aware of its predicament	Low awareness of its situation
3.	Zombie Organisation	Oblivious to new circumstances	Functions by habitual actions
4.	Comatose/Vegetative State	Unaware of its predicament	Functionally unaware of itself

Full Organisational Consciousness

In the above case, all 6 links are direct

This diagram is an idealised representation of assets and/or agents which are part of an organisation that is fully conscious. The scaling up of clusters of 'players' will reduce the organisational consciousness number and/or quality of interactions among them. If we increasingly model beyond 4 'players' in 3D - hierarchies progressively emerge and soon the number of indirect connections outnumber the direct connections between players.

Yshido's Idea of The Iceberg of Ignorance (1989)

research on distribution of knowledge in Japanese companies (1989) The hierarchy seldom creates synergy. To achieve synergy we may need to de-centralise our 'control' systems. By making long chains of command we tend to create alienation. Misunderstandings may build up if some collaborators cannot meet some others. Here (below) cubes 1 and 4 can only 'see' 1 other adjacent cube.

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Fig. 3 - Cubes stacked to show lack of consciousness

Yshido used the metaphor of an iceberg to visualise a succession of information blockages at successive tiers of management. This was inspired by his 1980s study of Japanese organisations which were managed in a rigid hierarchical manner. The arrows in the diagram depict the direction of instructions flowing down to employees. However, the percentages shown reflect a relative lack of corresponding information flowing upwards.

Limits to the Simple Model of Organisational Consciousness

There are several caveats concerning Minsky's simple model of Organisational Consciousness. The first is that it appears to be based on a self-polling algorithm, rather than a heuristic sense of curiosity. In other words, it spends a high proportion of its time checking to see if it is performing its usual tasks. Tacitly, this is similar to looking for a high ratio of connections, relative to the number of parts in the organisation. This may, therefore, be an insufficient basis for evaluating consciousness as an important factor in long-term survival. Also, in regarding inanimate codes and biological organisms as equivalents there is the risk of overlooking the experiential dimension. Perhaps, for example, sensory experiences and feelings play an important role in how (biological) living systems survive. Indeed, the particular relations and interconnection necessary to create meaningful sensations, experiences and feelings are both subtle and complex. Some philosophers have speculated about this by inventing a hypothetical creature they call a zombie. To external observers, it conducts itself just like a human organism. However, it feels no pain or excitement. (Perhaps we might consider whether there are similar living organisations that resemble 'autistic', or 'sociopathic' organisations).

Arthur Koestler described what he called the 'paradox of the centipede’ (Koestler, 1964). In its structure and behaviour, the centipede dedicates a high proportion of its consciousness to walking. This makes it unable to visualise useful strategies that are far outside the immediate task of moving its many limbs in the appropriate order. In corporate language, economists refer to zombie companies which, after covering their ongoing costs (wages, rates, rent) only have enough funds to service the interest on their loans, but not the debt itself. Hence, what may be missing in both the centipede and the zombie company is a requisite level of interactions and perceptions that extend beyond its immediate routines. Just as the centipede remains absorbed in the immediacy of avoiding obstacles, etc., so the zombie companies may be consist of highly active, energetic and 'efficient' employees. In each cases, however, the organisational/structural problems outweigh the organisation's higher sense of purpose and vision. This stops it from noticing opportunities and from thinking beyond its parochial, day-to-day habits.

Virtual Consciousness

Today, social media, and other virtual (digital) systems, are played an increasingly important role in the shaping of human experience, society and identity. For example, many young people seem willing to invest their conscious acceptance of online identities as a normal part of their whole identity.

The Digital Unconscious

John Monk (1998) speaks of a 'digital unconscious' that is created for individuals by a society consisting of banks, governments, computer programmers, etc. "The digital unconscious is disembodied, distributed, collectively constructed and substantive. It creates a concealed persona and triggers unanticipated, inexplicable, occasionally distressing actions." (Monk, in Wood, 1998).